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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes an interpretation theoretical model of the Aufbau of Rudolf Carnap, 
this interpretation contributes to upgrade the project original carnapian, in the sense of 
conferring to the constitutional program of construction logical, less committed analytic 
equipment with an ontology or clearly defined epistemology. The setting in phenomenal 
logical reconstruction practice is elaborated for the visual field as a model whose 
potential user is a fellow ideal percipient, and, a subject epistemic that operates in the 
same way that a scheduled computer when he has been given basic phenomenal 
information and some algorithms logical. 
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Introduction 
About the proposing statistical inference problems, Carnap was the same 
level as Keynes and Ramsey. The method for addressing the problems of 
the economy during the first half of the twentieth century was different 
from the issues that generally affect the empirical sciences. The influence 
of the logic of Frege and Russell and the phenomenology of Mach and the 
Vienna Circle were propagated as fields of controversy in all areas of 
science. Carnap occupied the center of attention with Logische Der Aufbau 
der Welt, 1928 (The Logical Construction of the World). 
 
 
The logical construction of the world (Carnap, Aufbau, 1967) the first 
creative work of Carnap (1992), was usually subordinate to that aesthetic 
unity that emerged in different fields at the time were considered carefully 
separated and soon began looking for a unit: the arts in general, and first of 
the so-called fine arts (architecture, painting, sculpture), science 
(Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, etc.). This search for unity 
is an expression defined in the preface to the first edition. 
 
We feel the relationship which they have the attitude on which our 
philosophical work; with the mindset that today affects the most diverse fields 
of life. We feel this attitude in the currents of art, especially in architecture and 
in those currents that strive for new ways for human life to be meaningful, both 
personally and collectively, new ways for education and for the external 
organization in general. Sorry everywhere the same basic attitude, the same 
style in thinking and doing. It is a mindset that requires clarity in all things, but, 
however, recognizes that the interweaving of human life will never be 
completely transparent. It is a mindset that wants to care both in detail and the 
structure of the whole, the harmony between people and in the free development 
of the individual (Carnap, Aufbau, 1967, p. VIII). 
 
Philosophical strokes get the analytic attitude of Carnap in the Aufbau, 
display a delicacy in the detail that can only be compared for his fluency 
with the theme of a Bach fugue or a geometric line in a building Bahuaus 
(Wittgenstein, 1992, p. 71) 
Viewed from a distance, this work of Carnap is an Opus of art in every 
sense of the word, an example of meta-theoretical discipline that is exposed 
as a sign of rigor, study and critical application. 
The second reason to the paper is awarded by the relationship that I think is 
the Aufbau with a central aspect of Kant. It is to be more specific, what is 
designated by the term "architectural”. The idea of building an architecture 
or, say, a meta-theory to scientific knowledge described by the author of 
the Critique of Pure Reason as follows: 
 
I understand the art of architectural systems such as the systematic unity is what 
makes the ordinary knowledge in science, ie, transforms a mere aggregate of 
knowledge in the system, the architecture is the doctrine of the scientific in our 
knowledge, and thus belongs so necessary to the doctrine of the method. 
 
Carnap in the Aufbau is rigorously faithful to this ideal systematic 
philosophy; his theoretical model is to draw synthetically an architectural 
overview of the factors structured empirical knowledge. The user of an 
ideal observer model that builds progressively and through a complex 
method the types of entities that occupy the world, or rather the types of 
entities that occupy their knowledge of the world (Aufbau, §§ 125- 128). 
 
Obviously, the project is not strictly Kantian because the notion of form or 
structure in the Aufbau is purely logical; it is understood only in terms of 
logical form. For Kant, the purely formal logic is inadequate for the 
constitution of objectivity requires to be supplemented by referring to a 
transcendental logic of intuition: the "pure intuitions of space and time”. 
Carnap identifies its architectural conception through strong formal logic 
inherited from Frege and Russell (Aufbau, VI, p. x). In other words, what 
Carnap retains the architectural Kant, the notion of form or structure 
requires no a “priori synthetic judgments”. 
 
In short, the reconstruction project logical / phenomenological is supported 
by the methodological rules implemented in the Aufbau; these rules suggest 
a consistency ideal formal theoretical economics, two conditions of set-
theoretic logical architecture of the constitution. To this is added an 
aesthetic that is reflected in the syntactic-semantic elegance of the whole 
work and that is only discovered when the reader has had the patience to 
enter their details (Goodman, 1963; Suppes, 1988). 
 
Interpretations 
To the problem that developed the idea and the kind of hypothesis that says 
the author, we have synthesized some of the interpretations of the Aufbau 
recognized according to certain concepts that are proper. 
 
a) The classic interpretation: The Aufbau is proposed to establish a formal 
proof of the theory of knowledge of English classical empiricism, 
especially in its Lockean version. This purpose has not only failed in the 
representation of Carnap, but in principle it is impossible to achieve 
(Kambartel, 1978). 
 
b) The standard interpretation. The Aufbau is identified primarily with the 
philosophical ideal of logical positivism or logical empiricism, in 
particular, is the clearest presentation of the methodological principles of 
reductionism and verification (Quine, 1953). 
 
c) The logic interpretation. The Aufbau has its greatest merit in being the 
first systematic application of modern logic in the Frege-Russell tradition, 
to a different domain of pure mathematics: the domain of sensory 
experience (Villemin, 1971). 
 
d) The integrationist interpretation: The Aufbau is indeed the starting point 
of logical empiricism. Phenomenalism of Mach represents the criterion of 
significance of Wittgenstein and the thesis of extensionality Russell 
(Malherbe, 1979). 
 
e) The phenomenological interpretation: The Aufbau is the first rigorous 
representation of a phenomenal system, i.e., a set of rules to a minimum but 
adequate conceptual foundation for rebuilding the entire course percipient 
knowledge (Goodman, 1966; Moulines, 1973). 
 
 
As we see, these interpretations are not entirely mutually exclusive their 
differences consist in the kind of emphasis on any of the various themes of 
the work. 
 
 
The structuralism reconstruction 
The special feature of this work with respect to the interpretations above, 
depends on the phenomenological interpretation (Moulines, 1982), but to 
discover novel way from the metatheoretical structuralism program Balzer / 
Moulines / Sneed perspective Aufbau theoretical model (Balzer, Moulines, 
Sneed, 1987). Supports the hypothesis that holds the logical construction of 
the world of Carnap is ideally a theoretical model from a wide and 
extensive range of potential models that are part of the same theory. Those 
who share these models are so to speak, the same structure. 
 
An interpretation of the Aufbau theoretical model helps to update the 
original project of Carnap, in the sense of conferring a constitutional 
program of logical construction phenomenological an analytical 
instruments less committed to a clearly defined ontology or epistemology 
(Moulines, 1991). The implementation of reconstruction is made great 
sense as a potential user model that is an ideal subject perceiving (Aufbau 
§§ 57-63), i.e., an epistemic subject who operated a computer programmed 
so that when has provided basic information and some great software 
algorithms conjunctiva (Aufbau, p. 186; Neumann, 1980, Russell 1919, 
Kambartel, 1978). 
 
 
The task is to be built-in stages, from level to level, the basic perceptual 
entities conform their knowledge of the world (Goodman, 1993, p. 2-3). It 
is the work of a cartographer's knowledge and carefully designed detail by 
detail, a map to recognize the logical structure of phenomenal domain 
immediately perceived (Hempel, 1988). 
The definitions to condense the central goal of Aufbau, which are detailed 
in the central section of the work (IV.A objects own psyche §§ 106-122) 
are not interpreted in this work as "reductive links" or  eliminative 
definitions, but as rules of operation of a level of abstraction that uses the 
computer to go by relating the statements of empirical science with a 
particular type of construction experience, this process should be 
responsible establishing a phenomenon restricted domain (Hiram Caton, 
1974 , 1975, pp. 623-659). 
In our view, this reinterpretation of the definitional principles allows a 
more liberal version of the complete system, without limiting the logical 
principles to the formal conditions of eliminative bi-sections as with 
empirical reductionist interpretations of the Aufbau (Moulines, 1991). By 
the way, are cushioned the scope of the criticisms that have been made to 
the construction of objects in the physical world, in the sense of judging as 
irrelevant, from a logical point of view, the definitions appear there. These 
definitions merely set out the scope heuristic will have the so-called "rules 
of correspondence”. 
 
Therefore, this paper emphasizes the limits within which Carnap conceives 
of his work, these limits are determined exhaustively by constructive 
phenomenal domain in which it operates a subject. Carnap was confident 
that the progress of his method will allow the formalization of the basic 
concepts of physics, psychology and cultural studies, however, it’s like any 
other program phenomenological exposed to two serious problems, which, 
apparently, in principle can not be solved within this approach. The first, 
related to the theoretical terms and the second related to the semantic of 
observation. 
 
Based on the foregoing, this paper will attempt to differentiate the 
systematic requirements, extra requirements / systemic to be taken into 
account when developing a model such as we find described in the Aufbau, 
in our case, only examines the model taking into account the general 
description of the structural components or logical joint epistemic subject 
needs a rebuild and deductively represent entities of their immediate 
perceptual world. 
 
Three methodological values are invoked to the constitutional system 
Carnapian, first as a formal model, the rigorous management of the entities 
could not engage in any formal contradiction. Second, the properties of 
constructed objects may not be incompatible with empirical theories in 
which these were based and third, the entire system had to observe strictly 
speaking, a relation of epistemic warrant. It is noteworthy that in the 
Aufbau epistemology are not clearly defined. Carnapian general discipline 
in this regard is instructive and exemplary, constitutional theory is 
completely neutral with respect to the metaphysical or ontological issues, 
illustrates that neutrality Carnap systematic effort to recognize the 
contributions made by other models prior to his (Aufbau , §§ 1,2,6). The 
phenomenal system developed was outlined by the E. Mach on the analysis 
of sensations, or the more descriptive B. Russell in Our Knowledge of the 
external world. With the theoretical model developed in the Aufbau is met 
before work started by Mach and Russell, in the sense of having shown the 
right direction with proper instruments, we have here a model that manages 
to unify the architectural ideal of knowledge, namely rigorous 
concatenation of form and content (Russell, 1973, pp. 1067-1264). 
 
The visual field model  
The model can represent axiomatically Carnap, which means that it is 
possible to identify the primitive concepts and their transformation rules 
(Aufbau § 12-15). The base model will be restricted in order to derive 
(deduct) the principles for formulating deductive chains. This logical 
device a whole has to adapt to the conditions mentioned above 
phenomenal. 
 
Axiomatic representation in the Aufbau is limited strictly to the visual field 
(Aufbau, § 86). Indeed, this is a simplified version of the domain forma 
empirical observation. The conceptual framework is required to deduce the 
phenomenal conditions has to do with the appearance of the color spectrum 
in certain parts of the visual field, this requires a system of quality time, an 
order of places and finally, an order of the colors the spectrum. These are, 
so to speak axioms or primitive concepts of the system include a list of 
theorems further analytical and synthetic satisfy these axioms. 
 
The historical origin of the systematic model dates back to the theory of 
"sense-data" of Mach and Russell, only the author of the Aufbau, the 
starting point of the previous phenomenal system, was limited in several 
respects. For example, for Carnap it is unlikely that an epistemic subject 
was able to order an indefinite number of heterogeneous sensations, as we 
assume the work of Mach and Russell (Russell, pp.75-146). Carnapian idea 
(inspired by Gestalt theory, but formally independent of their empirical 
results) was that the primitives of the theory should be seen as global 
experiences through which the phenomenal entities referred to a chromatic 
order in a specific visual field will be constructed progressively from level 
to level through a method of extensive abstraction. This method of setting 
up what Carnap called the quasi-analysis (Aufbau, §§ 67-74, 75). 
 
The quasi-analysis was an innovative strategy that was formally deduced 
what we sense as part of a whole, based on the totality itself as indivisible 
units. This complex procedure allowed reinterpreting the concept Carnap 
"atomistic" of experience. Offering this as a class structure whose relations 
guide the axiomatic construction of the empirical material phenomena. 
Inspired by the work of Frege and Russell, our author formally define each 
class of objects in the system according to the dyadic relationship between 
a global experience and a class of equivalent classes (Aufbau § 40, §§ 70-
73). Then you define a specific class of experiences shaped by the 
intersection of the circles of similarity which is itself an attribute. 
Similar to the construction of real numbers from natural numbers by 
successive definitions of equivalence relations in the development of Frege 
and Russell, the theoretical model of the structure much more ambitiously 
Aufbau parts of the visual field and color as qualitative classes (Aufbau § 
81). However, between the construction of relations equivalent number as 
Frege/ Russell/ and Carnap phenomenal building there is a difference, for 
where these authors showed a relationship of equivalence between the 
abstract objects of its analysis, see Carnap technical difficulties when it 
comes the phenomenal world here the condition of reflexivity and 
symmetry formal, but not transitive! . Expressed in the language of realism, 
if an experience similar to x appears and y experience to an experience 
similar to z, this can not be phenomenally infer the relationship of 
similarity between x and z. 
In the Aufbau, however, Carnap we describe the representation of similarity 
relations from a previous relationship which he called "memory of 
resemblance”. This is the only primitive non-interpreted system from 
which will be built in due order: The similarity phenomenal qualities, 
visual field locations and order of colors in the spectrum. 
RM early formal relationship "memory of resemblance" (Ähnlichkeit 
serinnerung, Aufbau, § 108, § 119) states that "an experience x is 
remembered as partially similar to another experience and relationship, as 
stated previously is asymmetrical but not transitive. Intuitively RM 
comprises a qualitative temporal order between experiences. The condition 
of P (partial resemblance) is fulfilled in three cases: RM; yRMx; x= y, the 
latter case, the similarity between total or equivalent experience is possible 
only in ideal conditions. 
  
Among the two ratios derived from the RS, namely, the partial resemblance 
(PR) and the temporal precedence (PT) give no analytic relationship. The 
first refers to a qualitative relationship between experiences, while the 
second corresponds to a temporal order between them. PT is an asymmetric 
dyadic relationship, connected and transitive on the domain of experience, 
while SP is a reflexive and symmetric relation "is not transitive" (Aufbau 
§§ 153-155). 
 
In empirical terms the relation of partial similarity between qualities can 
mean: 
 
a) The same spectrum of colors displayed on the experiences x and y. 
 
b) That two chromatic aspects that differ only slightly in hue (different 
perception) appear in place of the visual field. 
 
c) That two color spectra of the same hue, appear in neighboring areas of 
the visual field. 
 
d) That two color spectra that differ only in their hue, appear in 
neighboring areas of the visual field. 
 
 
Carnap did not draw formal distinctions between cases (b) - (d), but defined 
the first case (a) as partial equality between qualitative experiences. 
Intuitively, two objects can appear identical with the passage of time, but 
each experience is unique in front of them (Aufbau §§ 76-77). 
 
Visual field 
With these basics we can move on to describe the visual field model 
Carnap. 
Denote by E the set of basic experiences of a subject perceiving  
 
 
[Fig 1] 
 
 
 
 
Implicitly between the set E, we find the relation RM-called "memory of 
resemblance”. This relationship in turn contains primitive order of temporal 
precedence between PT experiences, remember, this relation is reflexive, 
anti-symmetric and transitive. We then Carnap model was (E, PT, RM) in 
which: 
 
 
E: is the set of elementary experiences 
 
PT: is the relation of temporal precedence 
 
RM: I remember is the relationship of similarity between experiences. 
 
Thus, the theoretical model triple (E, RM, PT) forms the primitive 
axiomatic system, missing model definitions. 
 
 
It first defines the field of similarity as follows. Is a subset of experiences 
(AE), we say that A is a field of similarity if x  A implies that x TP y and 
for all and  A (if x is partly similar to everything and  A). The set CS of 
all fields of similarity is inductive ordered by inclusion. Circles of 
similarity then becomes maximal sets of CS. Intuitively, this definition is 
best expressed by stating that "Like a circle consists of a maximal set of 
experiences that are related to each other by partial resemblance." 
 
 
Like the circles we move to the definition of qualities. It is said that a 
quality is a non-empty set of experiences that satisfies the following axioms 
(Aufbau §§ 115, 122, 180): 
 
 
(1) A is a field of similarity 
 
(2) If CS is a circle like a quality q is such that / / q CS / /> 
       (q covers more than half of C ") then q  CS. 
  (3) If x is an experience, is an attribute q and x  q, then there is a circle of 
like CS such that x  C q C 
In short, a quality is a subset of at least one set of CS, since CS displayed 
intercepted. 
 
We say that an attribute is a subset consisting of two circles that intersect 
like, subset, in turn, can not be divided by the intersection. In Axiom (2) 
the factor ½ is included to exclude cases of accidental intersection between 
qualities, ie similarity circles fail to form a quality. 
 
 
[Fig 2] 
 
 
 
The formal logical definition of the qualities can be described intuitively by 
the operational rules that searching a computer for calculating the 
phenomenal construction as follows: in order to structure the qualities, the 
computer selected in principle a large number of circles of similarity , then 
collect all the experiences that have a relation of SP. So is giving input 
pairs to the similarity circles c, c  already have a common domain 
intersections (over half). Then a third circle c  will contain more than half  
DC, to build c, the computer will be processed cc   c ... until a maximal 
circle C which is the field of a specific quality. 
 
 
In the next higher level of constructive steps are represented structurally 
visual field locations. This requires pre-define the relationship "others" 
among qualities. Two qualities are alien if q q =. Exclusion circles define 
as follows: Let C be the set of all qualities. A circle is a subset exclusion  
C such that q, q     implies that q q´ =. This means that a circle of 
exclusion is a kind of qualities beyond (non-overlapping). Empirically 
ajenación a circle is a kind of qualities such that none of its elements is part 
of the same experience. This is because the two qualities of the same circle 
of exclusion can occupy the same place in different experiences. The visual 
field locations are just as indivisible nuclei exclusion circles, as well as the 
core qualities are indivisible from the circles of similarity. 
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Thus, the instrumental set-theoretic sense and the minimum criteria for 
phenomenological model Carnap in the Aufbau, is axiomatic structure the 
various parts to build the entire system, ie the construction of the qualities 
based on the experiences global units, followed by the development quasi-
analytical classes that correspond to our intuitive notion of the color 
spectrum. Then the process restarts again but this time the indivisible units 
being compared belong to the same order of colors and the relationship of 
the circles of exclusion between visual field locations. 
 
 
The general then is: from the primitive relation of similarity remember, it is 
the relationship of similarity between experiences, the field of similarity, 
circles of resemblance and qualities. This is a great first step. With the 
qualities and attributes the similarities between the senses are constructed 
as topological dimensions. The direction which has dimension five is the 
most important: The vision. Within two fundamental structures are 
constructed and to some extent parallel: the visual field, consisting of more 
ordered and the spectrum, consisting of colors arranged. 
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The outline axiomatic model is developed with all the formal rigor at the 
lower level of incorporation based on the psyche itself, that is, until now we 
realize the basic components that requires an observer to reconstruct the 
structure of their visual field. What the Aufbau not illustrate with equal 
detail, the method is quasi-analytical successively higher levels to trace the 
route that takes the phenomenal world, the world's perception of 
physiological and subsequently to the objects that make up the physical 
world. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The target goal was to provide a reconstruction of the visual field in the 
Aufbau Carnap. The theoretical model underlying our reading is Carnapian 
phenomenalism inherited by the logic work of Bertrand Russell and E. 
Mach. The Aufbau is moving towards a more all-encompassing on the 
reconstruction of the physical, psychological world and the abstract world 
of theory. The review from the psyche itself excludes an ontological 
foundation or realistic, shows the importance of the same model suggested 
by Carnap. 
 
In the reconstruction of the model have worked other authors: Goodman, 
1963, Villemin, 1971, Kambartel, 1978 Moulines, 1991) so that this article 
extends their contributions. Carnap's fundamental contribution is to have 
identified your model with the empirical possibilities of building an 
epistemic subject can be accomplished with basic elements of the material 
world. The model sets out the framework within which an observer 
analyzing and processing experimental data in the form of global 
experiences. 
 
The model describes the Aufbau Carnap's logical structure does not expose 
a genuine and independent, but a collection of such achievements logical / 
semantic that once were essential between members of the Vienna Circle. 
The debate opened by Carnap still relevant to complementary disciplines. 
From neuropsychology to experimental work on the brain, the model of the 
visual field is narrow enough, certainly, but the way they work and the 
language used in the Aufbau is still a challenge. 
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